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Abstract: Coping or adaptation following large-scale disturbance may depend on the 
political system and its preparedness and policy development in relation to risks. Adaptive 
or foresight planning is necessary in order to account and plan for potential risks that may 
increase or take place concurrently with climate change. Forests constitute relevant 
examples of large-scale renewable resource systems that have been directly affected by 
recent environmental and social changes, and where different levels of management may 
influence each other. This article views disturbances in the forest sectors of Sweden and 
Canada, two large forest nations with comparable forestry experiences, in order to 
elucidate the preparedness and existing responses to multiple potential stresses. The article 
concludes that the two countries are exposed to stresses that indicate the importance of the 
governing and institutional system particularly with regard to multi-level systems including 
federal and EU levels. While economic change largely results in privatization of risk onto 
individual companies and their economic resources (in Canada coupled with a contestation 
of institutional systems and equity in these), storm and pest outbreaks in particular 
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challenge institutional capacities at administrative levels, within the context provided by 
governance and tenure systems. 
Keywords: adaptation; adaptive capacity; Sweden; Canada; forestry; economic crisis; 
forest pests; storms 
 
1. Introduction and Aim 
Adaptation and adaptive capacity have become an increasing focus of the hazards and risk literature 
in recent years. This reflects the growth of the climate change issue in public awareness and media, but 
also growing awareness of how large events and changes influence increasingly complex societies and 
systems. For instance, extreme storms, floods and drought, such as the large drought in Europe in 
2003, highlight the need for crisis response measures in society. In addition to raising awareness of 
climate change, such incidents have also been linked to potential increased risks due to climate change, 
for instance, for longer time droughts or more severe floods (for instance in low-lying areas in the  
UK [1]). The occurrence of large storms in areas where storms previously have been rather unusual is 
another example. The storms in southern Sweden in 2005 and 2007 that resulted in massive 
infrastructural consequences as well as storm-felling of wood are but one example [2]. The mountain 
pine beetle (Dendroctonus ponderosae) outbreak that caused large losses in the Canadian forest 
industry constitutes another example. Parallel risks can be seen both in the context of unseasonal 
temperatures and increased potential for movement of species through trade, whereby pest outbreaks 
may also occur in previously undamaged territories [3,4]. 
Such instances of large-scale disturbance emphasize societal requirements for dealing with long, as 
well as short-term, change (i.e., outbreak or crisis situations). They also contribute to greater awareness 
of potential impacts on standing stock in forestry, a land use where some northern areas may have  
seen climate change largely as a positive contribution due to longer growing seasons and higher 
production [5]. However, as forestry is a large areal land use, it has been noted that “climate variability 
is particularly important… because extreme events such as extended droughts have much more drastic 
consequences on tree growth and survival than gradual changes in average climate conditions” [6]. 
Beyond environmental change, forestry has also seen large impacts from economic change, both 
gradual change in terms of changes in requirements for competitiveness over the long term, and short 
term impacts such as those linked to the recent economic crisis. 
Concerns with these kinds of effects are echoed in the general literature on adaptation and adaptive 
capacity. While a focus on adaptation has developed in the climate change literature in particular, this 
literature exhibits awareness that climate change risks cannot be seen in isolation from globalizing 
features, such as large-scale economic and market change [7]. Adaptations to economic and 
environmental changes take place concurrently and these changes together constitute the structure 
within which actors in management and decision-making set priorities and determine responses [8]. As 
a result, it is important to discuss the ways different systems respond and whether common 
characteristics can be identified to support adaptation in forestry systems. 
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Following a comparative explorative approach, we highlight three stresses on forestry systems, 
namely economic change, abiotic (storms) and biotic (pest outbreaks) disturbances, and outline 
adaptations taken and limitations in adaptive capacity for dealing with these stresses. Two main 
questions guide our inquiry:  
• What adaptations have been taken in response to the different stresses, and what sort of 
adaptive capacities have been drawn upon? 
• Can similarities in limitation or development of adaptations or adaptive capacities drawn upon 
be identified? 
Our paper draws from different cases in two large forest nations, Sweden and Canada, with an eye 
to different examples that, although context-dependent, may indicate needs for preparedness or 
adaptive foresight planning and potential measures to increase adaptive capacity at different 
management levels. 
2. Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
Vulnerability to change is defined as the sensitivity of a system to a particular type of exposure  
(so called exposure-sensitivity), mitigated by the adaptive capacity of the same system [9,10]. 
Exposure-sensitivity indicates the total impact on a geographical or organizational unit depending on 
its sensitivity to a stress, and the exposure to this stress (e.g., a storm) [11]. Adaptive capacity is 
defined as the ability of the unit in question—e.g., a community, region or larger system—to adjust to 
or otherwise handle (adapt or cope with) this stress. Adaptation involves the development of actions  
that go beyond earlier responses, while coping involves extending previous response patterns to  
cope with a new stress [8,12]. However, the boundary between coping and adaptation is fluid and 
coping patterns may develop into more innovative adaptations: “adaptations may be autonomous and 
manifest [themselves] through a modification of coping strategies” [8]. Adaptations may here be 
undertaken in an uncoordinated fashion by different actors (e.g., community, region, state, industry) 
and are often reactive in direct response to observed change. Planned or proactive adaptation or  
adaptation strategies, such as crisis response plans, would instead aim to limit vulnerability to further 
exposures [13,14]. 
Community vulnerability to an exposure such as an economic shock or drop in timber prices, for 
instance, thus depends on factors at several levels in multi-level governance systems—that is, not only 
how a particular community responds, but also on how the region or state responds, and what adaptive 
capacities are present at different levels [1]. Factors that impact community responsiveness to stresses 
may include the economic structure of forestry, regional economic structure, as well as the adaptive 
capacity of the local forestry communities, i.e., drawing upon other sources of income or developing 
higher priced goods (refinement) that can mitigate price drops. 
Adaptive capacity literature developed on social systems and hazard response holds that coping 
with and adjusting to change depends upon numerous features, including institutional, political, 
economic, social and individual/human resources [9]. For instance, the well-established framework in 
Smit and Pilifosova [15] grouped determinants of adaptive capacity under the headings of economic 
resources; technology; information and skills; infrastructure; institutions, and equity, which are treated 
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in the following paragraphs. Other scholars offer similar categorizations as well as characterize the 
relationships among these features [16-18].  
Economic resources include the economic assets and financial means that any actor can draw upon, 
for instance, access to loans, a mother company, or individual resources owned by a private 
entrepreneur. They may both include fixed assets such as infrastructure (e.g., roads, water and energy 
generation facilities, stores, factories, machinery) and liquid assets such as municipal budgets, 
individual and household savings, business cash flow and operating funds [19]. For the purpose of 
viewing adaptation within different territorial contexts in this paper, economic resources may also 
include regional, provincial, national, or federal aid programmes, company funds, or support for 
employment and innovation in a given region. Actors may also adapt by drawing upon technological 
resources, which may include technological upgrades to become more efficient and competitive in 
international markets, thereby raising the economic resources for adaptation.  
Information and skills include knowledge about available adaptation options—for instance, 
knowledge about alternative buyers that might mitigate economic downturns or about plant material 
that may be better suited to climate change conditions in order to mitigate climate change risks. Such 
knowledge resources may include forest inventories, regional economic, labor force or other structural 
data. However, access to knowledge may be limited for instance by competition among companies, 
levels of government and communities in relation to market opportunities. Infrastructure encompasses 
both physical infrastructure such as access to roads or transport and, for example, access to  
decision-makers through which support (or physical infrastructure development to support businesses) 
may be gained. 
Institutions include access to developed adaptation options and plans available to support 
adaptation, or those developed amidst change. The institutional dimension also refers to institutional 
and policy networks available to assist adaptation (see also Brown [20] for a discussion of institutional 
adaptive capacity). Finally, the equity dimension relates to the distribution of power, for instance 
whether small-scale and large-scale actors have the same chances of adapting or whether vulnerability 
is transferred to other actors and/or sectors by the adaptations undertaken. The equity dimension thus 
draws attention to interactions within the other dimensions (e.g., that knowledge may be stratified 
between different groups in society) [15]. It also recognizes the importance of where responsibility for 
adaptations rests, and whether this falls to state or individual actors, in order to highlight equity 
(allocation) dimensions and to make clear “adaptation by whom” [13]—in this case, whether the state, 
region, forest industry, individual forest managers, private forest owners or other actors.  
Drawing upon previous research [19,21-25], Klenk [26] explicitly extended the framework of 
determinants of adaptive capacity to relate access of different groups to the determinant resources. 
Klenk [26] defines adaptive capacity as the potential of groups (e.g., communities, regions) to access, 
mobilize and deploy assets and endowments through mobilizers to plan and respond to change, without 
degrading those resources and mobilizers. The adaptation process or pathway is defined through the 
access to, mobilization and deployment of, capital assets. High adaptive capacity requires the presence 
of effective mobilizers, which include the role of cross-level institutional and governance arrangements 
and actors in facilitating or constraining adaptation actions taken by different stakeholders. Such a 
perspective [26] thus explicitly defines in particular the institutional parts of determinants of adaptive 
capacity as a linkage to the other capital resources [27]. Limitations to adaptive capacity are thus 
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manifest when there is a lack of access to capital assets and ineffective mobilizers, for instance limited 
economic resources, knowledge or infrastructure, weak institutions, and poor governance and equity 
arrangements pertaining to the actors involved in adaptation processes or pathways [28]. If  
well-developed and case appropriate pathways are developed, this will support adaptation to the  
post-catalyst/opportunity environment resulting from a disturbance. On the other hand, if a 
process/pathway is resistant to change, adaptation mainly refers to the pre-catalyst or disturbance 
environment [21].  
For the purposes of our analysis, we focus on key determinants of adaptive capacity in forest 
planning and policy. In order to understand crisis response, it is crucial to understand what adaptations 
are undertaken, as well as what adaptive capacities are relied upon, and whether these contribute to the 
development of planned adaptation strategies, rather than reactive management at the time of the crisis. 
Our analysis focuses on access to capital assets such as economic and technological resources, 
information and skills, and mobilizers such as effective institutions and governance arrangements, as 
well as equity in different spheres of social relations [15,19]. The institutional factor of determinants of 
adaptive capacity (i.e., the ways in which plans and strategies to deal with disturbances are developed 
or drawn upon) will be given specific attention in this paper, given that planned adaptation or 
adaptation strategies (such as crisis response plans) are important to limit vulnerability to further 
exposures [14].  
In this paper, we have chosen to focus on Sweden and Canada given that a large part of the GDP in 
both nations (4% and 3% respectively) derives from the forestry sector, which includes the wood 
industry, pulp and paper, and forestry [29]. Each country supports forestry on its state-owned lands 
(about 15% in Sweden and 90% in Canada), in Sweden managed by the state productive forest 
company Sveaskog among others, and in Canada managed by the provincial governments [30]. In 
Sweden, however, a large proportion of the land (about 50%) is also owned by small-scale forest 
owners, and a proportion is owned by private forest companies (some 25%) [31]. This is different from 
Canada where public timber is leased to the forest industry by way of licenses granted to individual 
forest companies by the province to undertake forest management and logging [20]. In both countries, 
the forest industry has focused on high-volume commodities such as pulp, paper and timber, which are 
today increasingly sold on a world market.  
We have chosen to compare Sweden with Ontario, Canada given that these regions have a similar 
population size and density distribution along a latitudinal gradient, and they have similar geographical 
distribution of forest ownership (see further Table 1). In each region ownership by large companies is 
relatively more common in the north, while smaller private land-holdings are more common in the 
south. While much of the institutional capacity in Sweden may be developed on a national level and 
expressed in national law, ordinances or policy of the national Swedish Forest Agency (SFA) for 
instance, Canadian institutional capacity to respond to changes may be developed on a provincial level 
with regard to policy development. Thus it is reasonable to compare Swedish national responses with 
Canadian provincial responses in reviewing institutional determinants. In Sweden, responses may also 
depend on the actions of individual forest owners, forest owners’ organizations and local businesses 
such as sawmills [12].  
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Table 1. General characteristics of territorial units (based on [32] unless stated otherwise). 
Territorial 
unit 
General  
charac- 
teristics 
Sweden Ontario Canada 
Area (km2) 450,295 917,741 9,093,507 
Population  9,316,256 13,210,667 34,299,000 
Population density and 
distribution 
20.6/km2 
Higher density in southern part of 
the country 
13.8/km2 
Higher density in southern part of 
the province 
3.41/km2 
Higher density in 
southern part of the 
country 
Forest ownership Private individuals (families) are the 
largest single category of forest 
owners. Approximately half of the 
country’s forests are family owned, 
with the other half being divided by 
6% other private owners, 3% state-
owned, 14% state-owned companies, 
1% other public ownership, and 
some 25% private-sector companies 
(Swedish Forest Agency 2009, [33]). 
The average size of a private forest 
is about 50 hectares. In the southern 
part of the country, they are the 
dominant category, accounting for 
80% of forest land. 
89% of forest lands are owned by 
the government; 11% is owned 
by private landowners; 
1% of privately owned forests are 
used for production purposes. In 
Northern Ontario, 75% of 
commercial forest land belongs 
to the province [34]. 
In Southern Ontario, 87% of land 
belongs to private owners. 
About 8.5 million people (25% of 
Canadians) live in Southern 
Ontario. 
80% provincial 
ownership, 11% federal 
ownership (mainly parks 
and military reserves), 
9% private ownership 
(ranges from 3% in 
Saskatchewan to 92% in 
Prince Edward Island). 
To review responses within these systems, we have selected recent disturbance events that refer to 
both changes that may become more common with climate change and changes that relate to a 
globalizing market environment, as neither would occur in isolation. Adaptation takes place in response 
to concurrent stresses that are likely to include both globalization or economic change and climate 
changes [7]. Storms (an abiotic change) and pests (a biotic change) are examples of disturbances that 
may become more common with climate change. Economic change is both identified by interviewees in 
the cases as well as by literature on globalization as change that needs to be considered as concurrent 
with environmental change, in order to understand adaptive options. To assess the extent to which policy 
developments are supporting or building the basis for adaptation to stresses in the future, we are thus 
reviewing not only explicit adaptation policy (which has so far been relatively limited in the areas,  
see [35]) but the general development of policy that supports responding to the selected stresses.  
In general, the study data draw from literature reviews and semi-structured interviews, with a focus 
on regions where disturbances have occurred. Swedish data on responses to economic changes are 
drawn from semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in forestry in the county of Norrbotten (the 
Pite River Valley) in 2003–2004 (n = 12, described further in Keskitalo [12]) and with multi-use forest 
stakeholders in the municipality of Gällivare in 2008 for the case of economic restructuring  
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(n = 27, [36]). These cases are from a low-populated county of Sweden which traditionally has been 
strongly forestry-dependent. Data may illustrate larger changes within Sweden but are specific to the 
region (e.g., in terms of the extent of impact on communities where forestry has played a large role and 
in relation to impact within a limited economic structure). Translations of quotes in the text are made 
by the lead author from the original Swedish.  
Data on economic change in Canada are drawn from research on changes in Ontario’s forest sector 
and forest communities during the 2000s [37,38]. The results presented herein reflect insights gleaned 
from 59 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in a multi-level forest governance setting in the 
Northeast Superior Region of Northern Ontario, as well as a review of over 200 local newspaper 
articles, government, industry, civil society and labor reports, and regional public workshops covering 
the impacts of the regional forestry crisis. 
In addition, Swedish data regarding storms derive from a survey of policy literature developed in 
response to storms and a pre-study undertaken during 2009 in Kronoberg county and Växjö 
municipality, which were among those strongly impacted by the 2005 Gudrun storm. Swedish data 
regarding pest outbreaks come from a literature survey of existing pest regulation and Swedish Forest 
Agency work. Likewise, the Canadian case studies on storms and pests draw on a literature survey and 
a knowledge synthesis of invasive alien species (IAS) and climate change in Canada [39], as well as a 
policy review of IAS legislation in Ontario [40]. 
3. Results 
3.1. The Case of Economic Disturbance 
Economic disturbances are defined here as changes that force adaptation within industry or a sector 
in general, such as restructuring or recession. Two different periods of forestry recession are discussed 
below, namely the 1990s in Sweden and the 2000s in Canada (the latter culminating with the recent 
global economic crisis). 
Sweden: Economic restructuring has had a major impact on the Swedish forest industry especially 
in the 1990s and during the recent economic crisis. While gradual changes were identified over the 
time interviewees had been working in forestry, many saw changes as culminating in the 1990s 
(drawing upon 2003–2004 data). Stakeholders in the forestry sector thus described large-scale 
economic change not as an isolated event, but as an ongoing trend with large effects over time. The 
forestry industry was identified as increasingly internationalized, which has led to increased 
competition and to the bankruptcy of smaller local industries. Time periods with larger changes can be 
identified, such as the closure of small sawmills in the 1990s, although many small-scale operations 
have also continuously experienced higher competition. In general economic change in the last few 
decades has been characterized by decreased employment locally, increased technology and 
technology dependence, and increased size of operations, to the point that smaller sawmills have  
gone bankrupt. As one interviewee noted: “today you need large plants to make ends meet”  
(forestry industry). The structure for forest entrepreneurs has also regularly changed from smaller 
location-based, company-employed units, to larger mobile entrepreneur units. The forest industry is 
also largely technology-dependent, and many interviewees suggested that forestry has replaced 
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“people with technology” during the last few decades. This means that technological resources and 
funding to invest in such have often been crucial for development of increased efficiency, at the cost of 
local employment. 
Small-scale operations may adapt by finding customers who are able to pay more for a specialized 
product—for instance through the development of international sales networks—or, in one case, by 
gaining support from the mother company during times of crisis (thereby increasing availability of 
capital for investment). Some companies have grown within a specific niche in order to be able to 
better compete, for instance focusing on particular refinement (wood houses, doors, windows), 
whereas others have become part of larger operations such as the larger entrepreneur units that were 
formed from previous in-house or smaller units in order to increase competitiveness. Knowledge of 
foreign markets has thus become increasingly important, and the access to economic resources for 
restructuring has been crucial. 
Limitations to adaptation include lack of available funding for reinvestment, limited international 
linkages to buyers (limited knowledge of foreign markets), and limited linkages between management 
and product development that become even more important with increasing competition. Given that 
Sweden does not have general subsidies for forestry, interviewees perceived institutional support to be 
limited in relation to economic change. Some interviewees also noted the problem with gaining state 
loans in the current economic climate (e.g., sawmill bankruptcy). With the large industry ownership of 
forest in Sweden, however, larger units, unlike small-scale operations, possessed capital for investing 
in technology and increased competitiveness. Larger-scale units have drawn upon structural changes at 
lower levels, such as promoting large separate entrepreneur units rather than employing entrepreneurs 
within the company. In responding to this process, interviewees also recognized that local 
entrepreneurship refinement or supportive sectoral cultures (e.g., nature tourism) had been limited and 
would need to develop to support local employment in the face of companies limiting their 
employment locally: “we need to get the persons who now inherit forests to start thinking along new 
lines” (forest owners interest organization). 
Ontario, Canada: In Canada, forestry stakeholders well recognize the larger influence of economic 
restructuring and rural change on the domestic forest industry and communities. In view of the 
Swedish experience, similar changes have occurred over the long term in Canada with respect to 
efficiencies in commodity production gained through labor-replacing technologies, as well as the 
influence of multinational companies and export markets [41]. Yet the recent decade-long forestry 
crisis is commonly described as a ‘perfect storm’—an unusual event that differs from bust periods 
observed in the past–attributable to the convergence of numerous challenges to the industry  
(e.g., rising energy costs, US housing market crash, weakening American dollar). Industry decline is 
illustrated by the drop-off in Crown timber harvesting (−45%) and related provincial revenues (−33%) 
between 2001 and 2008 [42]. 
In response, there has been consolidation in the industry where fewer, larger companies are 
increasingly controlling larger areas of forest land and provincial fiber allocations. This has been the 
case in Ontario for example, Canada’s hardest hit forestry province, where over the past decade 
continuous corporate restructuring has produced a string of merger, takeover, and closure 
announcements and contentious rerouting of public wood fiber among regional mills. 
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To address the crisis, the provincial government responded by creating the Minister’s Council on 
Forest Sector Competitiveness in 2005, which led to three major provincial aid programs [43]. In June 
2005, the province unveiled a $350 million loan guarantee program to promote forestry investment and 
modernization. Perceived by some as a bailout, this support was intended to help the forest industry 
become competitive during a period of uncertainty and transition. In September 2005, another 
$330 million was provided through the Forest Sector Prosperity Fund, intended to encourage forest 
company expansion and modernization. In February 2006 the provincial Liberals revealed another 
$220 million in industry aid to assume costs for road construction and maintenance (previously paid 
for by companies) and reduced resource rents. Several months later an additional $140 million energy 
rebate was announced for northern pulp and paper producers. These provincial initiatives were meant 
to help companies adapt and be more innovative during crisis. For communities and workers affected 
by mill closures, the Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities’ Adjustment Advisory 
Program also created co-funded Community and Labor Adjustment Committees. 
More fundamentally and forward-looking, in March 2009 the province set out to modernize the 
controversial Crown forest tenure and pricing system. The tenure system is commonly held to be 
problematic [44,45] and, as recognized by interviewees, it has constrained diversification and 
innovation by limiting access to fiber for new entrants such as local enterprise, First Nations and 
communities: “We’ve got a small log home producer... and we have a fella’ out here on the hill making 
timbers. These guys have a hell of a time getting wood even though [the local] mill brings in wood that 
is too big for its own facility” (forestry industry). The present system has hampered development of 
non-conventional forest products and uses (e.g., bioenergy; medicinals; forest foods). 
Ontario’s current tenure policies are based on the century-old notion of sustained yield harvesting 
and were designed to provide a steady flow of fiber to designated processors through timber 
liquidation. Consequently, these policies emphasize timber harvesting rights (deemphasizing  
non-timber products) and long-term security for large investors through leases that are renewed every 
five years. About 80% of annual fiber allocations are associated with large-scale processing facilities 
that require high minimum fiber volumes to be economically viable, and 100% of the annual cut comes 
from designated forest areas [44]. 
This rigid institutional setting has made it difficult to change policies, reconfigure mill operations, 
and redirect fiber flows without impacting specific mills, towns, and forests. While reforms are 
ongoing as of February 2011, the provincial review is expected to separate management planning 
responsibilities from processors and there remains pressure from First Nations, municipalities, labor 
and civil society groups to create community-based tenures. Until recently in Ontario, there has been 
limited focus on and a lack of knowledge and institutions supporting forest product innovation and 
market development. As apparent from interviews, some forest companies and entrepreneurs are 
working to retrofit existing and idled mills for co-generation, wood pellet plants, and bioresource 
extraction and processing more broadly, though securing loans and fiber allocations remains 
challenging given the shifting institutional and economic climate. Non-timber forest products are also 
seen by major industry representatives as a niche market at best, and development of these products 
has been left to community-level research organizations and consultants (e.g., Food Security Research 
Network based in Thunder Bay; Northeast Superior forest Community Corporation based in 
Chapleau). The following statement by one major forestry company representative indicates the 
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general attitude towards value-added among large-scale processors: “I don’t think that the solutions are 
all these little value added... There’s a place for that don’t get me wrong... But what I’m saying is you 
absolutely need a strong primary forest products industry for any of these guys to exist” (forestry 
industry). 
While provincial investments and tenure reforms are underway to improve the competitive 
environment for forest companies and entrepreneurs, a major limitation is that forest policy, 
management, planning, and enterprise remain dominated by conventional thinking. Centralized control 
of forest resources and a commodity export focus have lead to a culture of resource dependence. A 
focus on resource extraction is pervasive, shaping the way provincial officials, locals and business 
leaders think about and act on forestry problems and solutions, to illustrate: “For years we’ve relied 
upon mining and the forest sector and that’s how we’ve seen it” (Provincial official). 
3.2. Abiotic Disturbances: The Case of Storms 
Abiotic disturbances such as storm events, fire or drought may increase due to climate change. This 
could in turn result in storm felling, especially under conditions such as wet ground, which may also 
become more usual during milder winters, and in specific forest structures. Storm felling could 
promote conditions beneficial to forest pests, thereby increasing risks of infestations [2,6,46]. 
Sweden: During recent years, Sweden has experienced two major storms, “Gudrun” in 2005 and 
“Per” in 2007, both of which impacted southernmost Sweden. Gudrun resulted in large-scale 
infrastructure disturbance including weeks-long power outages as well as large-scale storm felling 
amounting to the total annual felling in Sweden, damage to forest roads, increases in pests, and formal 
initiation of a discussion of adaptation to climate change in forest management. An example of 
immediate adaptation, the Swedish Road Administration undertook road improvements in Kronoberg 
County, with support from the European Union (EU). In addition, individual road owners could apply 
for state funding for road repair. The large impact of the storm caused major investigations and 
adaptive measures in forestry by the Swedish Forest Agency, the Swedish Road Administration, 
county administrative boards, and forest owners, which have supported the development of planned 
adaptations. The storm has also led to an increase in wood transport by rail rather than road among 
forest companies, improved clearing of forest surrounding railway lines in forest lands, and projects on 
limiting the spread of pests especially in national level forest management—a result of the large 
amounts of dead wood resulting from the storm. 
Institutionally, forest companies have started to consider increasing the variation at the stand level 
from that of existing monocultures that are vulnerable to storms. The storm issue also informed the 
governmental Swedish Commission on Climate and Vulnerability finalized in 2007 [5] where Gudrun 
was mentioned as an example of consequences of storm occurrences. The Commission notes that both 
education and information efforts by the Swedish Forest Agency and individual actions on the part of 
forest owners are important to promote adaptation to future impacts of climate change. Given the large 
proportion of small-scale forest owners in southern Sweden, this group is in particular defined in the 
state investigation [5] as having significant responsibility for future adaptation. The need to review 
insurance protection for forest areas is also noted. General adaptations to make forests more  
storm-hardy would, among other things, include replacing economically valuable but storm (and 
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drought) sensitive spruce with other species, especially in southern Sweden. However, it remains 
unclear whether many local forest owners or industry will take actions to modify forest structure, given 
that such changes may have economic impacts. For small-scale forest owners, possibilities of 
integrating adaptation measures in management may also be constrained by a lack of information and 
knowledge, as many small-scale forest owners live away from their holdings, limiting their 
engagement with management planning. 
Adaptations can thus be seen both at the governmental level, including a focus on improved risk 
management in policy (the state and the state’s response systems, infrastructure development and 
education efforts), and at the forest management level. On a forest management level, storm risk has 
been described as an issue for both forestry companies and private forest owners given that both 
groups are major property owners, but may be limited by economic, institutional and 
knowledge resources. 
Ontario, Canada: In January 1998, a series of ice storms in Eastern Canada and some neighboring 
US states created a build-up of ice from freezing rain that caused extensive damage to forests and 
energy infrastructure. The storm left four million residents across eastern Ontario, and southern 
Québec and New Brunswick without power and some remained without power for three weeks. The 
emergency response planning and the emergent networks of actors including municipalities, police, 
fire, ambulance, public transit, health and social service personnel, Canadian army, as well as research 
organizations and thousands of volunteers, proved to be effective in mobilizing and deploying needed 
resources and skills to deal with the disaster on multiple fronts, including providing knowledge 
extension for maple sugar and woodlot owners among other impacted groups [47,48]. 
In Ontario, more than 604,000 hectares of forest were damaged in the ice storm. The economic 
impacts of the ice storm have been estimated to be $5.5 million in losses to the sugar maple industry, 
and depending on age and the amount of damage sustained, per hectare losses for red pine plantations 
ranged from $560 to $13,236 and those for white cedar ranged from $307 to $1,721 [49]. Within days 
of the storm, a joint federal/provincial program was established to assess damage and monitor the 
recovery of eastern Ontario forests [50]. This program addressed short-term needs including training 
technicians so that consistent damage assessments and recommendations suitable for urban, suburban, 
and rural landowners could be made, summarizing current literature and developing management 
guidelines. Longer-term needs focused on helping maple sugar producers and woodlot owners. The 
program was successful in implementing scientific experiments designed to document effects of 
damage on sugar maple stands, determining if one or more remedial treatments could reduce the 
required recovery time, and documenting responses of various species to damage and the 
biological/economic effects of damage and post-damage salvage for woodlot owners. 
Apart from demonstrating the adaptive capacity of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and 
the Canadian Forest Service to engage in timely and effective knowledge extension and production, 
training and monitoring, no forest policy-developments resulted from the ice storm. Research [51] 
showed that past forest management had no effect on the severity of the damage of the ice storm to 
forests; therefore there was little need to change forest regulations to prepare for future ice storms. 
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3.3. Biological Disturbances: the Case of Pests Outbreaks 
Biological disturbances such as pest outbreaks and invasive species are an increasing risk both as a 
result of climate change, where wet and warm conditions with limited freezing periods, may be 
beneficial to these biological agents [52], and as a result of increased globalization, whereby pests and 
other species may be transported (e.g., in waste water or in wood packaging to locations where they 
have previously not existed) [3,4]. 
Sweden: In Sweden, the risk of pest outbreaks gained significance following storms Gudrun and 
Per, where large-scale government projects have targeted the spread of the spruce bark beetle  
(Ips typographus). An indigenous species, spruce bark beetle increased with impacts on storm-felled 
and standing forest following the Gudrun storm and may potentially cause large forest damage. With 
regard to this species, some post-storm funding has targeted information to individual forest owners 
and overviews of the state policy readiness. Consequently, the Swedish Forest Agency provided  
34 million SEK (about 3.5 million Euro) for monitoring and analysis of insect populations and 
information on pests. The SFA also introduced a pest control project. Adaptations or adaptive 
capacity-building measures thus include awareness on the need for improved connections between 
forest interests conducting monitoring and coordination in the areas, as well as suggestions from the 
SFA to change regulations on when logged or fallen wood should be removed from grounds (a concern 
for fallen wood especially in nature reserves). 
Concerns for invasive alien species such as the pine wood nematode (Bursaphelenchus xylophilus) 
have also increased given trade within the European Union (EU). Some countries, notably Portugal, 
have outbreaks of the pine wood nematode, with subsequent risks that it may spread to and become 
invasive in Sweden. The issue thereby becomes one for Swedish and European Community regulation, 
because Sweden, as an EU member, cannot unilaterally control issues that may conflict with the free 
movement of goods and services. At the EU level, there exists an early warning and information 
system, working groups on invasive species regulation options, and specific control measures for the 
pine wood nematode in particular in Portuguese source material; however, no harmonized EU level 
approach to control IAS has been developed. 
On a Swedish national level, there exist a strategy including species monitoring and development of 
an early warning system as well as a multi-agency coordination group for invasive species. The pine 
wood nematode, regulated in Swedish law as a plant pest for which admission and spread is prevented, 
is currently the only species for which full consequence analysis and a plan for measures has been 
developed. The governmental strategy in 2008 observed that invasive species legislation is at present 
relatively undeveloped [53], thereby constituting a limitation to the possibilities for planned 
adaptation. This policy gap is partly a result of the fact that development of regulation on invasive 
alien species that are spread by waste water from ships or wood packaging for products in the EU may 
be considered a limitation of free trade within the EU and global context (under the World Trade 
Organization). It is also a result of the complexity of the issue including the large number of 
potentially invasive species and differential responses to pest outbreaks. While invasive alien species 
and trade are issues for individual forest owners, forest companies, and the Swedish state—and  
indeed institutional capacity overall—larger systems such as the EU and the global context thus also 
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impact and currently limit the adaptations taken. As the pine wood nematode would benefit from 
warmer summers and drought stressed trees, risks are foreseen to increase over time as a result of  
climate change. 
Ontario, Canada: In Ontario, the risk of pest outbreaks has come into focus in part due to the 
mountain pine beetle (Dendroctonus ponderosae) outbreak in British Columbia [52]. Columbo [52] 
notes that as the beetle benefits from higher summer temperatures and water stress, it may be a 
question of time until the mountain pine beetle migrates into Northern Ontario. 
With regard to invasive alien species, many IAS have been reported in Ontario, and the province 
contains more IAS than any other province or territory in Canada [54]. Despite significant economic 
and ecological impacts of these non-native species (e.g., the annual cumulative cost of 16 IAS in 
Canada is estimated to be $13.3–34.5 billion) [55], IAS do not figure prominently in Ontario 
legislative policy. While recent strategic policy documents such as Ontario’s Biodiversity Strategy and 
the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources’ (OMNR) ‘Our Sustainable Future’ mention the need to 
prevent, monitor and control IAS, there is no single coordinating agency in charge of planning for, 
implementing and enforcing IAS regulations in the province. Instead, policies have arisen somewhat 
haphazardly from a patchwork of government agencies at provincial and federal levels, as well as 
through networked environmental governance organizations. 
The fragmented and uncoordinated development of IAS policy in Ontario reflects the multiple 
players involved in IAS issues in the province, as well as the complicated division of powers under the 
Canadian federalist system. The OMNR is the primary provincial agency responsible for IAS 
management and focuses mainly on monitoring, research, control, and public education. On the 
terrestrial front, the OMNR works in collaboration with several federal agencies, such as the Canadian 
Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Canadian Forest Service, and Ministry of Agriculture and Food to 
monitor and control invasive insect, plant and plant diseases in Ontario Crown forests. In partnership 
with the Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters (a non-governmental, non-profit organization), the 
OMNR runs a public awareness program to prevent and monitor the spread of aquatic IAS, and to 
investigate their impacts and options for their control. The OMNR is also involved with the non-profit, 
multi-agency Ontario Invasive Plant Council, whose mandate is to coordinate Ontario’s response to 
invasive plants. While a variety of players are thus involved, no single strategy exists to guide, 
prioritize and coordinate their efforts, and no single organization is responsible for overseeing and 
integrating provincial initiatives to prevent, control and eradicate IAS. 
Lack of legislative policy on IAS issues in Ontario is an additional obstacle to effective 
management. Currently, only one piece of provincial legislation specifically deals prevention and 
control (and it is restricted to a single watershed), although several other acts and regulations deal 
incidentally with IAS issues. Overall, these legislative tools have limited taxonomic scope, and lack 
clear, consistent standards on what non-native species should be prohibited and accepted into Ontario. 
The legislation is further hindered by weak enforcement capabilities and a discretionary inspection 
system. In addition, because many IAS vectors and pathways are under federal jurisdiction  
(e.g., international trade, navigation and shipping, fisheries), but the sectors at risk from IAS in Ontario 
are under provincial jurisdiction (e.g., forestry, agriculture, health, etc.), IAS regulations require the 
concerted cooperation of federal and provincial agencies. To date there have been few examples of 
successful cross-jurisdictional implementation of regulations on IAS. For example, the CFIA regulates 
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the importation of plants and plant products into Canada to prevent the introduction and spread of 
pests, including IAS. However, once in the country, there are no regulatory instruments in place to 
track or control the movement of IAS plants across provincial/territorial borders. In Ontario, a limited 
number of IAS plant species are regulated, and only if they occur on agricultural or horticultural lands. 
Many opportunities for the mobilization of knowledge on IAS can be found in Canada and there is 
evidence that science uptake by policy-makers is occurring, at least to some degree. For example, the 
institutional capacity to disseminate IAS information to government exists in organizations such as the 
Canadian Aquatic Invasive Species Network, a national research consortium of IAS specialists 
focusing on improving prediction, prevention, early detection and rapid response strategies for aquatic 
invasions. Similarly, the Ontario and federal governments recently established an Invasive Species 
Centre in the province, with the aim of coordinating initiatives to control the spread of IAS 
provincially and nationally. What is missing, however, is the actual translation of scientific knowledge 
on IAS into concrete policy to address these threats in Ontario, limited among other things by the lack 
of federal leadership and coordination on the issue of IAS prevention and control. 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The case studies examined in this comparison highlight both similarities and differences between 
Sweden’s and Ontario’s preparedness for and response to disturbance in forestry systems. With regard 
to the economic disturbance case, similar larger trends and impacts can be identified, such as the 
consequences in terms of smaller unit (sawmill) closures and restructuring into larger units that may 
impact local communities and possibilities for localized responses to disturbances (see also [56]).  
A notable difference between the cases is the fact that Ontario introduced a provincial loan guarantee 
program, while Swedish forestry is largely operating without state grants (although exceptions exist, 
such as the possibilities to apply for state loans for smaller operations). In Sweden, the comparatively 
large industry ownership (“Europe’s highest commercial forest ownership”, [57]) may offer increased 
opportunities for forest industry to adapt to change, and also means that questions of tenure or 
ownership are not pronounced in a fashion similar to that in Ontario. Indeed the high level of 
provincial forest ownership in Ontario suggests a state responsibility and therefore strong opportunity 
for provincial leaders to initiate regional adaptation and preparedness strategies in the forest sector. 
Although there have been large impacts on forestry structure (e.g., local sawmills and 
competitiveness) in both countries as a result of the globalization of the wood market and increased 
international competition, the pathways for coping with these stresses differ between the countries. In 
Canada, actions are largely situated at the provincial level, with locals, indigenous peoples, and some 
in industry lobbying the province for transfer of tenure to the local level. Capacities at higher levels 
(perceived as deficiencies in institutional systems and equity distribution) were thus highlighted in the 
Canadian case: forest product diversification and innovation are identified as limited by the tenure 
system, with provincial aid programs reinforcing the historical dominance of pulp and paper and 
lumber mills, while new entrants and alternative products and processes are underdeveloped  
(i.e., a focus on institutional capacity)—illustrating a potential resistance to change rather than 
adaptation to a post-crisis environment [26]. In Sweden, then, adaptations to economic stresses are 
largely company-level and dependent on economic resources available in each individual case as well 
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as technological developments to increase output from products: creating entrepreneurship, increased 
refinement and new competitive products (what may be seen as coping measures within the context  
of traditional forestry). Impacts of economic, technological and individual skills and knowledge  
capital [15] were thus highlighted in the economic change case study in Sweden, potentially a result of 
the structure of the forest industry in Sweden where the sector lacks general subsidies. In addition, in 
Sweden, a focus is placed on the need for developing entrepreneurship cultures (or adaptation 
pathways) that do not rely on forest production per se but may utilize other parts of the landscape, such 
as for instance tourism (adaptations that go beyond traditional forest industry practices). 
For both Sweden and Ontario, the storms and pests cases highlight the impact of government 
institutional capacities (mobilizers) and infrastructure to respond to threats and develop policy  
(also highlighted in general for adaptive capacity in forestry in Canada by Brown [20] and  
Johnston et al. [56]). With regard to storms, an institutional linkage was made in Sweden both for the 
need for developing policy in general on risk events and also with regard to potential risks associated 
with climate change. This link to climate change may be related to the occurrence of the storms taking 
place during the development of an ongoing governmental investigation on climate and vulnerability 
that drew further attention to future risks. It was also perceived that storm impacts were related to 
forest structure. In Canada, on the other hand, linkages between storm risk and forest management 
were not developed, nor were storm risks framed within the context of climate change. This difference 
may be due to the different nature of the storms in Sweden and Canada. As a result, policy responses 
regarding short term (storm event) and long term (climate risk) concerns developed in Sweden but not 
in Canada. This highlights that the framing of risks are crucial, as the framing process may impact 
political preference setting and resources allocated to a problem [37]. Other climate change risks have, 
however, been related to forestry structure also in Canada. For instance, the mountain pine beetle 
infestation in British Columbia affects vast areas of pine forest (Pinus spp.) that dominate the 
province’s landscape [14]. This makes it likely that adaptation to forest structure will need to be a part 
of the development of integrated climate change adaptation mechanisms. 
With regard to pests, both Sweden and Ontario lack strong means to deal with IAS, largely defined 
as a result of limitations within the multi-level institutional structure and related institutional and 
political infrastructure capacities and mobilization. In Ontario, lack of coordination among multiple 
players, coupled with lack of leadership at the federal level, contribute to the problem. This lack of 
cohesion at the federal level is, for the Swedish case, mirrored by the lack of strong EU level 
regulation on IAS, as Sweden cannot unilaterally regulate risks related to movement of goods and 
services. Inherent features of IAS (being generally unpredictable, having impacts spread among many 
stakeholders, being persistent and extremely difficult to eliminate once established) [58], may also 
constitute some explanatory factors why IAS have so far not gained high attention despite the 
ecological and socio-economic threats they pose. However, on issues that Sweden and Ontario have 
been able to act on independently (such as domestic pests in Sweden, or the establishment of early 
warning systems), improved monitoring coordination has been developed. 
With respect to IAS, there are significant adaptation constraints arising from the multi-level nature 
of requisite response systems With regard to adaptation to climate change in general in Canada, this 
institutional, multi-level and multi-actor focus is highlighted by Brown [20], who notes that 
government, industry, First Nation, community and civil society actors will need to act together in 
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working or task groups. Some examples already exist in terms of interaction bodies such as the 
advisory Expert Panel on Climate Change Adaptation under the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 
or the Eastern Ontario Model Forest, which has been active in stakeholder cooperation and research on 
climate change since the mid-1990s ice storm events [20]. Adaptation in forestry may thus also be 
dependent upon the development and mainstreaming of adaptation policy, the lack of which has been 
noted in Canada to constitute an institutional and policy barrier to adaptation [35]. 
In sum, the study illustrates that access to economic assets have been particularly important for 
adapting to economic disturbances [18]. Economic resources make it possible for businesses to 
develop and mobilize technological and knowledge assets. In general, economic resources can make it 
possible for smaller-scale actors to gain access to particular buyers that are able to pay well for very 
specific products. Such requirements may, however, place large demands on individual actors and 
result in large impacts on restructuring to improve economic viability, in particular for small-scale 
actors (thereby bearing on equity dimensions of adaptive capacity [15]). Economic resources are not 
the only important determinants of adaptive capacity, but are linked to institutional processes and 
governance arrangements, which is emphasized particularly in the Canadian case. 
In contrast, effective institutional structures and processes and governance arrangements have 
played a larger role in adapting to natural disturbances (abiotic and biotic) in both of the case study 
areas, especially in relation to the mobilizing and deployment of information and skills necessary to 
cope with disturbances and opportunities. For example, the effective mobilization and deployment of 
assets through multi-level governance arrangements required for developing management and 
monitoring plans on an issue as complex as IAS is particularly challenging, both within the Canadian 
federal context and for Sweden within the EU context. For the issue of storms, framing  
(an institutional issue) as well as knowledge development within forest management is challenging. 
The results suggest that institutional development and foresight planning, as well as development of 
information and skills, on the part of the state (in Sweden) or province as well as at the federal level (in 
Canada), could potentially have a larger role than presently exists in developing responses to climate 
change risks [35]. In particular, there is a need to move beyond event-based, to some extent 
reactive policy development towards proactive integration of adaptation measures in forest 
management practice. 
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